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ABSTRACT
Asymptotic Efficiency in Stackelberg Markets with Incomplete Information
by Jianbo Zhang and Zhentang Zhang*
This paper examines the asymptotic (in)efficiency of Stackelberg markets with incomplete
information.  Firms who are early in the queue make their quantity choices based on
limited information and their output choices are likely to deviate from those optimal under
complete information.  Due to the presence of both payoff externality and information
externality, the output deviations of early firms have a lasting effect on all subsequent
output decisions.  Consequently, the total market output diverges from the competitive
equilibrium output even as the number of firms goes to infinity. That is, Stackelberg
markets with incomplete information are asymptotically inefficient with probability one.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Asymptotische Effizienz in Stackelberg-Märkten mit unvollständiger Information
In diesem Beitrag wird die asymptotische (In-)Effizienz von Stackelberg-Märkten mit
unvollständiger Information untersucht. Unternehmen, die frühzeitig auf den Markt
kommen, bestimmen ihre Ausbringungsmengen unter unvollständiger Information. Aus
diesem Grunde sind ihre Mengenentscheidungen im allgemeinen verschieden von den
optimalen Ausbringungsmengen unter vollständiger Information. Auszahlungswirksame
Externalitäten und Informationsexternalitäten bewirken, daß die Mengenentscheidungen
der frühzeitig auf den Markt treffenden Unternehmen zu pfadabhängigen Mengen-
entscheidungen nachfolgender Unternehmen führen. Im Ergebnis ist dann die gesamte
Ausbringungsmenge aller Unternehmen verschieden von dem Konkurrenzgleichgewicht
- selbst dann, wenn die Anzahl der Unternehmen gegen unendlich strebt. Das heißt,
Stackelberg-Märkte mit unvollständiger Information sind asymptotisch ineffizient mit
der Wahrscheinlichkeit eins.
                                                          
* We would like to thank Larry Samuelsen for his insightful discussions on the topic of this paper.
1. Introduction
It is well known that markets may fail because of limited competition or the existence
of incomplete information1.  The inefficiency due to these two sources, however, can be
respectively eliminated in a large market as the number of firms tends to infinity.
Wilson (1977) demonstrates that in a sealed bid tender auction where each bidder has
private information, the winning bid will converge in probability to the true value of the
object as the number of bidders grows large.  This result is extended and generalized by
Milgrom (1979), who obtains necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence.2
Regarding the inefficiency from market power, Novshek (1980) and Robson (1990)
investigate Cournot and Stackelberg markets respectively and show that under general
demand and U-shaped average cost curves, the inefficiency arising from market power
will disappear asymptotically as the minimum efficient scale tends to zero.  That is,
both Cournot and Stackeberg equilibria under complete information converge to the
competitive equilibrium as the number of firms tends to infinity.
A natural question to raise is whether inefficiency in markets with both market power
and incomplete information is also eliminated as the number of firms tends to infinity?
The asymptotic property of the Cournot model with incomplete information has been
investigated in the literature.  Palfey (1985) shows that, under certain assumptions on
the information structure, a Cournot market with unknown demand becomes efficient as
the number of firms grows large.  Li (1985) obtains the same result by endogenizing
firms decision to share information.3  Vives (1988) demonstrates that Palfey and Lis
result depends on the production technology exhibiting constant returns to scale.
However, so far in the literature, no studies have looked at whether the inefficiency in
Stackelberg markets with incomplete information could be eliminated as the number of
firms tends to infinity?  That is, whether large Stackelberg markets aggregate
information efficiently?  This paper attempts to fill this gap.
                                                
1 See, for example, Akerlof (1980) for classical discussion of the problem.
2 Swinkels (1996) shows that discriminatory private value auctions for multiple objects are
asymptotically efficient as the number of players grows large.
3 The incentives for Cournot oligopolists to share information have been studies extensively in the
literature, for example, by Li (1985), Shapiro (1986) and Vives (1984).  They conclude that when the
uncertainty is about a firm-specific parameter, perfect revelation is the unique equilibrium.  On the
other hand, when the uncertainty is about a common parameter, no information sharing is the unique
equilibrium.
2The information structure arising in Stackelberg competition is similar to the one in
information cascade literature introduced by Banerjee(1992), and Bikchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).  Under such an information structure, agents take actions
sequentially after observing the action history and a private signal.  An information
externality occurs since each agents private information is revealed, perfectly or
imperfectly, through its action to the following agents and may thereby alter their
believes about the underlying uncertainty.  This information externality may give rise to
information cascades4.  Although the literature on information cascade illuminates how
inefficiencies can be generated in a sequential action model through information
externality, it is not well suited to analyze the information aggregation problem in large
Stackelberg markets. The reason for this is that information cascade models assume that
there is no strategic value for a player early in the queue to manipulate its action in
order to influence the actions of the following players.  That is, they assume that there
are no strategic interactions between players and thereby no payoff externality. By
assuming away the strategic interactions, the information cascade literature captures the
inefficiencies resulting only from information externalities but not from payoff
externalities.5  In Stackelberg markets with incomplete information, the effects of every
firms action on the payoffs of its successive firms are two-folded:  First, the strategic
interactions between leaders and followers create payoff externality.  Second, every
firms action conveys its private information and thereby affects its following firms
belief about the unknown state, which creates information externality.  It is this payoff
externality entwined with the information externality, as shown below, that drives the
efficiency loss even as the number of firms goes to infinity.
The main result of the paper can be illustrated by considering the following scenario: a
number of firms engage in Stackelberg competition making their production choices
sequentially.  The nature of demand is unknown to the firms.  In addition to receiving a
private signal, each firm observes all the actions of the preceding firms and tries to infer
their private information through these actions.  Based on the private signal and the
inferred public information, every firm makes its quantity choice.  In general, this game
is an extended signaling game with many players where the quantity choice of each
                                                
4 An information cascade is defined, as by Lee (1993), as the convergence of the sequence of actions.  A
fully revealing information cascade is said to occur if the limit is optimal under the true state.
Otherwise, a non-fully revealing information cascade occurs.
5 Similarly, Vives (1993) studies the speed of convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium in a
simple dynamic model of rational learning between agents.  However, he assumes that the action of one
player does not affect the profits of other periods.  That is, he assumes that there are no strategic
interactions between players across periods.
3leader is a signal about its private information to all its followers.6  Recall that dynamic
games with incomplete information tend to have multiple equilibria and there is no
exception in this game.7  The refinement of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium adopted in this
paper is called the extended intuitive criterion, which is an extended version of the
intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).  More precisely, the intuitive criterion is
applied to every continuation game of the extended signaling game.  Since every
continuation game satisfies the single crossing property, the extended intuitive criterion
leaves us with a unique separating equilibrium.  This implies that every firms quantity
choice fully reveals its private information to all its followers.  Therefore, according to
the strong law of large numbers, the true state of demand is eventually revealed to the
firms who are sufficiently late in the queue. The basic point is as follows: in the
information cascade models with no payoff externality, the revelation of the truth
necessarily forces the later players to take actions which are optimal under complete
information. This cannot happen in the current model precisely due to the payoff
externality that is present.  Intuitively, the first firm can get either a high or a low signal
with a positive probability regardless of what the true state of demand is. As a
consequence, its quantity choice may be different from the quantity choice under
complete information. The quantity choice of the first firm will then affect the quantity
choices of all the firms later in the queue, due to the payoff externality.  As a result,
output deviations of early firms have a lasting effect on all subsequent output decisions
and the total market output does not converges to the competitive equilibrium. This is
true despite the fact that firms sufficiently back in the queue have almost complete
information about demand.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we sets up the model.  In
Section 3 we investigates the asymptotic (in)efficiency of the Stackelberg market.  In
Section 4 comments and concludes are given.
                                                
6 In this extended signalling game, every player has private information while in the standard signalling
games, only the first player has private information.
7 To obtain a unique equilibrium a refinement is necessary.
8 In our set-up, we do not assume that there is a designed mechanism which solicit information before
implementing the transactions as in Gul and Postlewaite (1992).  Neither do we assume there is a
market auctioneer who pools information and sets market clearing price as in Rutichini, Satterthwaite
and Williams (1994).  Instead, the private information is revealed through the quantity choices of the
firms.
42. Model
Consider a Stackelberg market with N firms making production choices sequentially.
Firms are assumed to have constant marginal cost; i.e., c q cqn n( ) = , n N= 1 2, ,... .
There are no fixed costs.  Following Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) and Vives
(1988), firms private information is about the demand intercept: p a S bQ= + − ;
where Q  is total market output and it is assumed that a c>  and b > 0 .  State S  is a
random variable which is distributed over a finite state space Ω ⊂ R1 .  The unknown
state could be interpreted as a parameter affecting consumers taste, so that a higher
state would result in a higher market demand and vice versa.  Firms do not know the
realization s  of S , but have common initial prior distribution µ0( ) Pr ( )s ob S s= = ,
which is assumed to be non-degenerate.
The information structure of the game is as follows: at the beginning of the game, a
state s  is drawn randomly from the finite state space Ω  and remains fixed throughout.
Each firm makes output choice based on its private signal and the public information in
order to maximize its profits. Following Lee (1993), the private signal of firm n, xn , is
drawn randomly from a Bernoulli distribution }{xn ∈ 0 1, . The draw of a signal is
conditionally i.i.d. given the state.
Firm n, chooses qn  from its action set AN , where [ ]A QN = 0, 9.  The fact that AN  is
compact and convex guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.  Given the state of
nature s , the information set of firm n is given by }{Ωn n nh x= , , where
h q q qn n= −( , ,... , )1 2 1  ( h1 = φ ) is the history of actions and xn  is the private signal of
firm n.  The behavior strategy of firm n, σn n n nq h x( ( , ))  is a mapping from the
information set to the action set.  Each firm, before making its output choice, has an
identical initial prior belief µ0( )s  over the states.  After observing the output choices of
its preceding firms as well as receiving a private signal, the firm updates its prior belief
according to Bayes rule.  The output choice is optimal with respect to the posterior
belief.  Let µn = prob s h xn n( ( , ))  denote the posterior belief of firm n.  Firm ns
expected profit function is given by E
nµ πn  = E{(a + - bQ)q }n nS c− Ω , where Q  is the
total market output.  We solve for Perfect Bayesian equilibria.
                                                
9 The upper bound of firm ns output is given by [ ]Q b a c N E S nn
N
= − +



=∑
1 1
1
( )Ω .  This is because any
choice of quantity greater than Q  results in a strict expected loss, regardless of other firms choices.
5Given the number of firms N and the realized signal vector rx x x xN= ( , ,... , )1 2 , a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter, PBE) is defined as follows:
Definition: A PBE is a set of strategies (σ σ1
* *,... , )N  and posterior beliefs ( ,... , )µ µ1 N
such that for any µ0 , hn and n=1,2,,N,
( )P1  σ πµn n n n q n n n n n N nq h x E h q q q q qn n
* * *( ( , )) arg max ( , , ( ),... , ( ))∈ +1 ;
( )P2  σ πµn i n q n i n i n i n i n i N n iq E h q q q q qn i n i+ + + + + + + +
∈
+
+
* * *( ) arg max ( , , ( ),... , ( ))1 , for any
i=1, 2,,N-n;
( )B  µn( ( , ))s h xn n  is derived from the prior µ0( )s , σn n n nq h x− − − −1 1 1 1* ( ( , ))  and
σn i nq− + −1 1
* ( )  according to Bayes rule, when applicable.10
That is, a PBE of an extended signaling game with N players requires that the strategies
yield a PBE for every continuation game.
To simplify the analysis, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The signals are unbiased estimators of the state. That is, E x s sn( ) = .
From Assumption 1, we have that s prob x sn= =( )1  and 1 0− = =s prob x sn( ) .  That
is, it is more likely to get a good signal ( xn = 1 ) when the state of nature is good.
Assumption 2: The conditional probability of  signal, xn = 1 , is strictly between 0 and
1.  That is, 0 1 1< = <prob x sn( ) .
Assumption 2 implies that for any given state, there is a positive probability that each
firm gets either signal xn = 1  or signal xn = 0 .  Assumption 2 rules out degenerate
cases.
To extend the spirit of subgame perfection to this game, we would like to require that
the strategies yield PBE for every continuation game starting from every possible
                                                
10 Note that if qn−1  is not part of firm (n-1)s optimal strategy for some private signal, observing qn−1  is a
probability 0 event, and Bayes rule does not pin down posterior beliefs.  Any posterior beliefs are then
admissible.
6history hn .  We make the following assumptions on players beliefs at the start of each
continuation game.
Assumption 3: For any history hn , player n+1 to player N have the same beliefs about
the state of nature given hn .
Recall that dynamic games with incomplete information tend to have multiple equilibria
because Bayes rule has no bite in out-of-equilibrium events and any posterior beliefs
are admissible at out-of-equilibrium information sets. Consequently, the game above
will potentially have multiple equilibria, unless we make use of a refinement. Using the
intuitive criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987), we propose an extended
intuitive criterion which means that we apply the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987) to every continuation game. In other word, we extend the intuitive criterion to
our extended signaling game with many players.
3.  Stackelberg Competition with incomplete Information
We can now investigate whether  Stackelberg  markets with incomplete information are
asymptotically efficient in the presence of both information and payoff externalities.
There are N firms making their output choice sequentially in a hierarchical Stackelberg
framework.  Without loss of generality, the order of firms actions is assumed to be
exogenously given by 1,2,..., N.11
Let us examine pooling equilibria first.  At a pooling equilibrium, firm n produces the
same output no matter what signal he gets (0 or 1).  The followers of firm n, firm n+1 to
firm N, therefore update their posterior believes only based on their private signals.
This implies that for any n, the information set of firm n is simply }{Ωn nx= .  Hence,
firm ns expected payoff function can be simplified to
E
nµ πn  = E{(a + - bQ)q }n nS c x− .
                                                
11 It is an interesting problem to endogenize the order of firms actions.  Mailath (1993) studies
endogenous sequencing of firm decisions in a duopoly setup with asymmetric information between
firms.  Chamley and Gale (1994) and Zhang (1997) endogenize the sequential choice of agents in an
information cascade context.
7The existence and refinement of the pooling equilibria are given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: Given the number of firms N and the realized signal vector
rx x x xN= ( , ,... , )1 2 , there exists a continuum of pooling PBE.  Furthermore, the
extended intuitive criterion eliminates all the pooling equilibria.
Proof: See Appendix.
Next, we study separating equilibria.  For a separating equilibrium, every firms
quantity choice perfectly reveals its private information.  Therefore, firm ns
information set Ωn  can be reduced to }{Ωn n nx x x x= −1 2 1, ,..., , .  Consequently, the
expected payoff function of firm n is given by
E
nµ πn  = E{(a + - bQ)q }n nS c x x− ( ,..., )1 .
The existence and the refinement of the separating equilibria are given by the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: Given the number of firms N and the realized signal vector
rx x x xN= ( , ,... , )1 2 , there exists a continuum of separating PBE.  Furthermore, the
extensive intuitive criterion eliminates all but one separating equilibrium which is given
as follows:
Q N x
a c
b b
E S
N
n
n
n
N
( , ) ( )
( )r
= −
−
+
=
∑1 12
1
21
Ω
,     (1)
p N x a bQ N x S( , ) ( , )r r= − + .        (2)
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 and 2 imply that the extended intuitive criterion equilibrium refinement
leaves us with a unique PBE.  Before proceeding to investigate the asymptotic
(in)efficiency of Stackelberg markets in the presence of both information and payoff
externalities, we present the following useful lemmas.
8Lemma 1: Along the unique PBE path, the best responses of firm ns followers, firm
n+1 to firm N, satisfy respectively
dq
dq
n
n
+
= −
1 1
2
,  
dq
dq
n
n
+
= −
2 1
4
,  ... , 
dq
dq
N
n
N n= − −
1
2
;  where n N= −1 2 1, ,... , and
}{Ωn n nx x x x= −1 2 1, ,..., , .
Proof: See Appendix.
From Lemma 1, it is trivial to show that 
dQ
dqn
N n
=
−( )
1
2
.  This is an important result as it
implies that the impact of a firms output choice on total output is smaller the later back
in the game the firm is. Conversely, the output choices of early firms have a lasting
effect on all subsequent output decisions.
In order to have a base for comparison, we use the perfect competitive equilibrium
outcome with complete information as a benchmark.12  The following lemma is trivial
to obtain.
Lemma 2: Let ( )Q s p s0 0( ), ( )  be the competitive equilibrium outcome with complete
information.  Then Q s
a c s
b
0( ) =
− +
 and p s c0( ) = .
We are now ready to state our main result regarding the asymptotic (in)efficiency of
Stackelberg markets with incomplete information.
Theorem: For any realization s  of S , Let ( )Q N s p N s( ), ( )  be the vector of random
variables which represents the unique (stochastic) PBE given by (1) and (2).  Then
( )Q N s p N s( ), ( )  converges to some ( )Q s p s* *( ), ( )  as N goes to infinity.  For almost
all realizations s , ( )Q s p s* *( ), ( ) ( )≠ Q s p s0 0( ), ( ) .13
                                                
12 Our main results would not change if we use the competitive equilibrium outcome under incomplete
information as the benchmark since the stochastic competitive equilibrium outcome converges in
probability to a degenerate distribution, as the number of firms goes to infinity (see Vives (1988)).
9Proof: From Proposition 2, for any N and rx , there exists a unique PBE given by
equation (1) and (2).  For any realization s  of S ,  it is trivial that
[ ]
Q N s
a c
b b
E S s
N
n
n
n
N
( ) ( )
( )
= −
−
+
=
∑1 12
1
21
Ω
, and
p N s a bQ N s s( ) ( )= − + ; where }{Ωn n nx x x x= −1 2 1, ,..., , .
As N →∞ , according to the strong law of large numbers,
[ ]
Q N s
a c
b b
E E S s
Q snn
n
( )
( )
( )*→
−
+ ≡
=
∞∑1 21
Ω
, and
[ ]
p N s c s
E E S s
p snn
n
( )
( )
( )*→ + − ≡
=
∞∑ Ω21 .
Let s*  be the unique solution to the following equation:
[ ]
s
E E S sn
n
n
=
=
∞∑ ( )Ω21 .
It is then trivial that ( ) ( )Q s p s Q s p s* *( ), ( ) ( ), ( )≠ 0 0  unless s s= * .            Q.E.D.
The Theorem shows that the Stackelberg output is insufficiently low ( Q s Q s* ( ) ( )< 0 )
when the true state of demand is good ( s s> * ), while it is insufficiently high
( Q s Q s* ( ) ( )> 0 ) when the true state of demand is bad ( s s< * ). In sum, the Stackelberg
output is asymptotically inefficient with probability one.14
The intuition behind the above result is as follows.  Firms make their production
decisions sequentially based on their private information as well as the inferred public
information of the preceding firms.  Since every continuation game of the Stackelberg
                                                                                                                                              
13 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the way this theorem is now stated.
14 The fact that the stochastic Stackelberg equilibrium outcome does not converge to the competitive
equilibrium outcome is equivalent to stating that there is no convergence to a degenerate distribution
since the degenerate Stackelberg equilibrium outcome converges to the competitive equilibrium
outcome (See Robson (1990)).
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game satisfies the single crossing property, the extended intuitive criterion selects a
separating equilibrium, which implies that the leaders quantity choices fully reveal
their private information.  Consequently, the firms who are sufficiently back in the
queue have almost complete information, according to the strong law of large numbers.
However, the firms who are early in the queue have very limited information about the
unknown demand and their quantity choices tend to be different from the choices under
complete information.  In addition, these early firms production choices affect the
output choices of the later firms due to the payoff externality existing in the game.
Therefore, the deviations of the early firms output choice have a lasting effect on all
subsequent output decisions and causes the total market output to be diverging from the
competitive equilibrium output even as the number of firms goes to infinity.
The above theorem can be further illustrated in the following example.
Example: Suppose the initial prior distribution µo s( )  is the uniform distribution over
(0,1).  The expected value of posterior distribution in the unique separating PBE can be
simplified as:
E S
n
xn n
n
N
( )Ω =
+
+



=∑
1
2
1
1
, where }{Ωn n nx x x x= −1 2 1, ,..., , .15
Therefore, 
[ ]E E S s ns
n
n
n
n
n
n
( )
( )
Ω
2
1
2 21 1=
∞
=
∞
∑ ∑= +
+
 by Assumption 1.
Hence, Q N s
a c
b b
ns
nnn
( )
( )
→
−
+
+
+
=
∞∑1 12 21 ;  p N s c s
ns
nnn
( )
( )
→ + −
+
+
=
∞∑ 12 21 .
From Taylor expansion ln( ) ( ... ... )1
2
2
− = − + + + +r r
r r
n
n
 for − < <1 1r , we have that
1
2
1
2
6 8 2 4 2 2 5 0 46 0 27
1
n
n
ns
n
s s
=
∞∑ +
+
= − + − ≈ +( ln ) ( ln . ) . . .
Therefore, Q N s
a c
b b
s Q s( ) ( . . ) ( )*→
−
+ + ≡
1
0 46 0 27 , and
p N s c s p s( ) ( . . ) ( )*→ + − ≡0 54 0 27 .
                                                
15 See Welch (1992).
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It is trivial that Q s Q s* ( ) ( )< 0  if s >
1
2
, Q s Q s* ( ) ( )> 0  if s <
1
2
, and otherwise
Q s Q s* ( ) ( )= 0 .
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have demonstrated that large Stackelberg markets do not aggregate
information efficiently, even if the technology exhibits constant return to scale.  That is,
in the presence of incomplete information, Stackelberg markets are asymptotically
inefficient with probability one.  This is because the early firms make their production
choices based on the very limited information and consequently tend to over- or under-
produce.  In addition, the payoff externality ensures that the quantity choices of the early
firms have a lasting effect on the output decisions of all subsequent firms.  As a result,
the over- or under-production of the early firms gets carried over and drives the
efficiency loss.
The extended intuitive criterion selects a unique separating equilibrium, which ensures
that each firms private information is fully revealed to the successive firms and
accordingly the underling uncertainty is gradually resolved along the queue as the
number of firms becomes large.  Therefore, firms who are sufficiently far back in the
queue have almost complete information about the demand.  In this sense, there is no
efficiency loss from the information externality per se, and there is no possibility for a
non-fully revealing information cascade to occur.  It would be interesting to investigate
a class of games where agents actions do not fully reveal their private information.16  In
this case, a non-fully revealing information cascade may arise as discussed in
Banerjee(1992), Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), and Zhang and Zhang
(1995).  The efficiency loss in these games is therefore expected to be larger due to the
additional inefficiency from information externalities.
                                                
16 One example of this class of games is a Stackelberg game where each firm can only observe some but
not all its preceding firms actions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: At a pooling equilibrium, each firm updates its posterior belief
only based on its own private signal, i.e. { }Ωn nx=  for n = 1, .., N.  For any given N and
history hn , a pooling equilibrium is said to survive the extended intuitive criterion if it
survives intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) in every continuation game.  We
solve this game backward.
1.  Continuation game N
For any given hN−1 , this continuation game consists of only the Nth firm whose
equilibrium output is given by,
[ ]q E q a c S bQ xN q N NN* arg max ( )∈ − + − (A1)
2. Continuation game N-1
For any given hN−2 , this continuation game consists of firm (N-1) and firm N.  Let qN−1
denote a pooling equilibrium for firm N-1.  Firm (N-1)s expected payoff is
[ ]E q a c S bQ bq xN N N N− − −− + − −1 1 1( )* , where Q qN i
i
N
−
=
−
= ∑1
1
1
 and q qN N
* ( )
−1  is
given by (A1).
Thus the best way to sustain qN−1  as a pooling equilibrium is to assume that firm N
believes that firm N-1 gets signal xN − =1 1  when it observes ′ ≠− −q qN N1 1 .  So qN−1  will
indeed be a pooling equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satisfied.
(M1): [ ]E q q xN N Nπ( , )*− − =1 1 1 [ ]≥ ′ ′ =
′
− −
−
max ( , )*
q N N NN
E q q x
1
1 1 1π ,
(M2): [ ]E q q xN N Nπ( , )*− − =1 1 0 [ ]≥ ′ ′ =
′
− −
−
max ( , )*
q N N NN
E q q x
1
1 1 0π ,
where q qN N
* ( )
−1  is given by (A1) and ′ ′ −q qN N
* ( )1  is given as follows:
[ ]′ ∈ ′ − + − =
′
−
q E q a c S bQ x xN q N N NN
* arg max ( )( , )1 1 .
Therefore, there exists a continuum pooling equilibria [ ]q q qN N N− − −∈1 1 1, , where qN −1
and qN −1  are the lower and upper bound of qN−1  which satisfies (M1) and (M2).
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In order to eliminate this continuum pooling equilibria, we use intuitive criterion of Cho
and Kreps (1987) to this continuation game.  Define ′ <
− −
q qN N1 1  by the smallest root of
[ ]E q r xN N Nπ( , )*′ =− −1 1 1 [ ]= =− −E q q xN N Nπ( , )*1 1 1 , where
[ ]r E r a c S bQ bq br x xN r N N N N N NN* arg max ( )( , )∈ − + − − ′ − =− − −2 1 1 0 .
Now, playing ′ −
−
qN 1 ε  (for ε > 0 ) is equilibrium dominated for firm N-1 with signal
xN − =1 1  but not for firm N-1 with signal xN − =1 0  since
[ ]E q q xN N Nπ( , )*′ =− −1 1 0 [ ]− =− −E q q xN N Nπ( , )*1 1 0
=
= − =
>
− −
E S x x E S x x
b
N N N N( ( , )) ( ( , ))1 11 0
2
0 .
Therefore, firm Ns posterior belief should put all the weight on xN − =1 0  following
output ′ −
−
qN 1 ε .  However, firm N-1 who gets xN − =1 0  prefers to playing ′ −−qN 1 ε  to
qN−1 .  Thus, qN−1  is not pooling output anymore.
3. Continuation game N-2
For any given hn−3 , this game consists of firm N-2, firm N-1 and firm N.  From
assumption 3, firm N-1 and firm N have the same believes after observing qN −2 .
Applying the similar argument and technique used in last continuation game to this
continuation game, we can eliminate pooling equilibria in this continuation game.
Continuing this process for every continuation game, we will then eliminate all the
pooling equilibria. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: For a separating equilibrium, every firms quantity choice
perfectly reveals its private information.  Hence, the information set of firm n can be
simplified to }{Ωn n nx x x x= −1 2 1, ,..., , .  In addition, a separating equilibrium is said to
survive the extended intuitive criterion if it survives intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987) in every continuation game.  We solve this game backward.
1.  Continuation game N
For any given hN−1 , this game consists of only firm N whose equilibrium output is
given by
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[ ]q E q a c S bQN q N NN* arg max ( )∈ − + − Ω , where }{ΩN Nx x x= 1 2, ,.., .          (A2)
2.  Continuation game N-1
For any given hN−2 , this game consists of firm N-1 and firm N.  At a separating
equilibrium, the private information of firm N-1 is fully revealed to firm N through its
quantity choice.  Therefore, for firm N-1 with signal xN − =1 1 , it chooses the following
optimal quantity:
[ ]q E q a c S bQ bq q xNH
q
N N N
H
N N N
N
− − − − − −
∈ − + − − =
−
1 1 1 1 2 1
1
1* *arg max ( ( ))( , )Ω ,    (A3)
where Q qN i
i
N
−
=
−
= ∑1
1
1
 and q qN
H
N
* ( )
−1  is given by (A2) with xN − =1 1 .  That is,
[ ]q q E q a c S bQ x xNH N q N N N NN* ( ) arg max ( )( , , )− − −∈ − + − =1 2 1 1Ω . (A4)
On the other hand, for firm N-1 with signal xN − =1 0 , a separating equilibrium qN−1  is
such that the following conditions are satisfied jointly:
(S1): [ ]max ( , )( , )*
q N N
H
N N
N
E q q x
−
− − −
=
1
1 2 1 1π Ω [ ]≥ =− − −E q r xN N N Nπ( , )( , )*1 2 1 1Ω ,
(S2): [ ]E q r xN N N Nπ( , )( , )*− − − = ≥1 2 1 0Ω [ ]max ( , )( , )*q N NH N NN E q q x− − − − =1 1 2 1 0π Ω ,
where qN
H*  is given by (A4) & [ ]r E q a c S bQ x xN q N N N NN* arg max ( )( , , )∈ − + − =− −Ω 2 1 0 .
(S1) says that when firm N-1 gets signal xN − =1 1 , it does not want to produce the
output which corresponds to signal xN − =1 0 .  (S2) says that when firm N-1 gets signal
xN − =1 0 , it does not want to produce output which conveys signal xN − =1 1 .
Therefore, there exists a continuum separating equilibria [ ]q q qNL NL NL− − −∈1 1 1, , where
q
N
L
−1
 and qN
L
−1  are the lower and upper bound of qN
L
−1  which satisfies (S1) and (S2).
Therefore, there exists a continuum separating equilibria.  The firm with signal
xN − =1 1  prefers playing qN
H
−1
*  while the firm with signal xN − =1 0  prefers playing[ ]q q qNL NL NL− − −∈1 1 1, .  From (S1), it is clear that playing qNL −1  is equilibrium dominated for
the firm with signal xN − =1 1 , but not for the firm with signal xN − =1 0 .  So firm Ns
posterior belief should put all the weight on signal xN − =1 0  following qN
L
−1 .  Let qN
L
−1
*
denote
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[ ]q E q r xNL
q
N N N N
N
− − − −
∈ =
−
1 1 2 1
1
0* *arg max ( , ) ( , )π Ω
Then qN
L
−1
*  is the unique separating equilibrium surviving the elimination of weakly
dominated strategies for firm with signal xN − =1 0 .
Hence, for any hN−2 , the equilibrium refinement of this continuation game leaves us
with a set of unique PBE strategy ( , )* *q qN N−1 , where qN
*  is given by (A2) and qN−1
*  is
given by the following (A5):
[ ]q E q a c S bQ bqN
q
N N N N
N
− − − −
∈ − + − −
−
1 1 1 1
1
* *arg max ( )Ω .  (A5)
3. Continuation game N-2
For any given hn−3 , this game consists of firm N-2, firm N-1 and firm N.  From
assumption 3, firm N-1 and firm N have the same beliefs after observing qN −2 .  By the
similar reasoning as in last continuation game, the elimination of weakly dominated
strategies of this continuation game leave us with a set of unique separating PBE profile
( , , )* * *q q qN N N− −2 1 , where qN
*  is given by (A2), qN−1
*  is given by (A5) and qN−2
*  is given
by the following (A6)
[ ]q E q a c S bQ bq bqN
q
N N N N N
N
− − − − −
∈ − + − − −
−
2 2 2 1 2
2
* * *arg max ( )Ω .  (A6)
Continuing this process for every continuation game, the extended intuitive criterion
leaves us with a unique separating PBE satisfying
[ ]q E q a c S bQn q n nn* arg max ( )∈ − + − Ω , for n= 1, 2, ,N.
Therefore, along the unique separating PBE path, we have
a - c - bq - bQ -  bq
dq
dq
 +  E( = 0n N n
i
ni=n+1
N
n∑ S Ω ) ;
where Q qN j
j
N
=
=
∑
1
 and n=1, 2, , N.17
Applying Lemma 1 (which is proved below) and rearranging the above equation, we
have
                                                
17 We have implicitly assumed that firms have rational expectations, i.e., E q q i ni i n i( ( ) ) ;Ω Ω = > .
16
q =  2
a - c + E(
n
* N -n nS
b
QN
Ω )
−



 ;  n=1,2,,N.
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Summing over n = 1,2,...,N, we have that for every N and the realized signal vector
rx x xN= ( ,... , )1 , the unique stochastic PBE which survives the extended intuitive
criterion is given as follows:
Q N x
a c
b b
E S
N
n
n
n
N
( , ) ( )
( )r
= −
−
+
=
∑1 12
1
21
Ω
.
Thus, p N X a bQ N X S( , ) ( , )= − + .  Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: We prove this lemma by mathematical induction.
Along the unique separating PBE path, we have that
a - c - 2bq - bQ  +  E( = 0N N -1 NsΩ ) ;  where Q qN j
j
N
−
=
−
= ∑1
1
1
.
Thus, the best response of firm N to firm (N-1)s output is satisfies that
dq
dq
N
N −
= −
1
1
2
.
Now suppose that the lemma holds for firm n+1.  That is, along the unique separating
PBE path, the best responses of firm (n+1)s followers, firm n+2 to firm N, satisfy that
dq
dq
n
n
+
+
= −
2
1
1
2
 , 
dq
dq
n
n
+
+
= −
3
1
1
4
,      
dq
dq
N
n
N n
+
− += −
1
1
1
2 ( )
(L1)
From the above, it is trivial that 
∂
∂
q
q
j
n+
= −
1
1
2
 for any j n≥ + 2 .  (L2)
Now we want to show the lemma also holds true for firm n.
                                                
18 We therefore assume that a c E S E S
E SN
N
n
n
n
N
− > −





=∑2 21 1min( ( ),... , ( ))
( )
Ω Ω
Ω
 in order to guarantee
that qn* > 0 .
17
From the proof of Proposition 2, firm (n+1)s best response along the unique separating
PBE path can be derived as follows:,
a c bq bQ b q bq
dq
dq
E Sn n j n
j n
N
j
nj n
N
− − − − − + =+ +
= + += +
∑ ∑2 01 1
2 12
( n+1Ω ) ; where Q qn j
j
n
=
=
∑
1
.
Rearrange it and applying (L1), we have
1
1
2
1
1
2
+



 + = − − +
− −
+
= +
∑( ) )N n n j
j n
N
nbq b q a c bQ E S( n+1Ω
Taking derivative with respect to qn , we have
1
1
2
1 1
2
+



 + = −
− − +
= +
∑( )N n n
n
j
nj n
N
b
dq
dq
b
dq
dq
b ;  (L3)
where 
dq
dq
n
n
+2
= − −
+1
2
1
2
1dq
dq
n
n
 from (L2).
Similarly,
dq
dq
n
n
+
=
3
− − −
+ +1
2
1
2
1
2
2 1dq
dq
dq
dq
n
n
n
n
= − −
+1
4
1
4
1dq
dq
n
n
,, and
dq
dq
dq
dq
N
n
N n
n
n
N n= − −− −
+
− −
1
2
1
21
1
1 .
Therefore, 
dq
dq
dq
dq
j
nj n
N
N n n
n= +
− − +∑ = − −

 +2
1 11
1
2
1( ) ( ) .
Substituting the above back into (L3) and rearrange it, we have that
dq
dq
n
n
+
= −
1 1
2
.
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Hence, 
dq
dq
dq
dq
n
n
n
n
+ +
= − − = −
2 11
2
1
2
1
4
,
dq
dq
dq
dq
n
n
n
n
+ +
= − − = −
3 11
4
1
4
1
8
,, and
dq
dq
dq
dq
N
n
N n N n
n
n
N n= − − = −− − − −
+
−
1
2
1
2
1
21 1
1 . Q.E.D.
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